Denver Law Review
Volume 13

Issue 9

Article 8

January 1936

Supreme Court Decisions
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Supreme Court Decisions, 13 Dicta 230 (1936).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

RAPE---SEPARATE TRIALS-ADMISSIBILITY OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE
-INSTRUCTIONS
MISCONDUCT Manship vs. The People-

No. 13734-Decided June 1, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
The information charged the defendants Manship and Vera
Brinkerhoff with the statutory crime of rape of Dora Shelton. Each
defendant was found guilty. Manship filed a motion for separate trial
some time before the trial on the merits and the trial court denied the
same on the ground that such a motion properly arises at and not before
trial on the merits. At the trial on the merits the defendant failed to
renew his motion for separate trial.
1. Where defendant files a motion for separate trial before trial
on the merits and fails to renew the motion at the time of trial on the
merits he cannot complain of the court's ruling deanying such motion.
2. Where a motion for separate trial is denied such ruling will be
affirmed where the bill of exceptions does not show the admission of
prejudicial evidence.
3. Evidence examined and held sufficient to sustain the verdict of
guilty.
4. Where it was material to prove that the age of a prosecuting
witness in a rape case was under eighteen years it was error, without
prejudice, to admit in evidence a so-called birth certificate merely signed
by the attending physician, where no evidence was introduced to prove
the signature or that the doctor was out of the state or otherwise unavailable as a witness. The error was cured where both the prosecuting
witness and her mother testified that she was fifteen years of age at the
time of the alleged crime.
5. It was error for the court to refuse a copy of the birth certificate of the prosecuting witness certified by the registrar of vital statistics
on the ground that the doctor's original certificate was filed with the
registrar later than ten days after the birth. The mere fact that the law
makes it the duty of the attending physician to file the certificate within
ten days does not affect the admissibility of copy thereof as such certified
copy is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
6. Where requested instruction contains two or more propositions of law and one of them is unsound, the court may properly refuse
to give the instruction.
7. Where the court instructed the jury that as a matter of law
neither misrepresentation by the complaining witness to the defendants
as to her age, nor her appearance with respect to age, nor the fact that
defendants, or either of them, actually believed that she was eighteen
years of age, are material, if, from all of the evidence the jury believed
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beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the alleged act of sexual
intercourse she actually was under the age of eighteen years, such instruction was error without prejudice in excluding from the jury the right to
determine the age of the prosecuting witness from an examination and
an inspection of her where it appeared from the uncontradicted evidence
that she was only fifteen years of age at the time the offense was committed.
8. It is too late to raise the objection of misconduct on the part
of the district attorney when the objection is made for the first time by
incorporating in motion for a new trial. It should be raised at the time
the alleged misconduct occurs.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Butler specially concurring by separate opinion. Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

REPLEVIN-ELECTION OF REMEDIES-DAMAGES-LIEU OF POSSESSION-SUMMARY ACTION---Summers vs. Moch-No. 13926Decided June 1, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This was an action in replevin before a justice of the peace of
Montrose County to recover possession of a horse alleged to be of the
value of $75. The property not having been taken under the writ,
trial proceeded as for damages and the justice of the peace found right of
possession to be in defendant. Plaintiff appealed to the county court.
While the matter stood on appeal in the county court the plaintiff
moved that the defendant be required to deliver the horse to the sheriff
and order was accordingly entered thereupon. Thereupon, the plaintiff
further moved that the defendant be confined in the county jail until
the horse was turned over to the sheriff and the motion was granted.
The defendant by petition to the district court for a writ of certiorari challenged the jurisdiction of the county court to proceed and on
hearing it was adjudged that the county court did not have jurisdiction
to make the orders.
1. That the property in controversy was not in his county explains the constable's failure to seize and take the horse under the
replevin writ.
2. Thereupon the plaintiff had a choice to proceed as for damages or for summary action looking to the incarceration of the defendant. Plaintiff elected to avail herself of the remedy for damages under
Section 6154, compiled laws of 1921.
3. Having made such election the plaintiff was bound thereby.
4. Her only remedy after election was for damages.--Judgment
affirmed.
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TENANT-MISJOINDER-CAUSE

OF ACTION FOR

DAMAGES-Henrylyn Irrigation District vs. O'Donnell et al,No. 13958-Decided June 1, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
John O'Donnell and James M. O'Donnell brought a joint action
against the Henrylyn Irrigation District to recover damages to land and
crops by the alleged negligence of the defendants in the construction and
maintenance of its canal. Complaint alleged that one of the plaintiffs
was the owner of the land and the other plaintiff the tenant and in
possession of the property, but there was no allegation that the plaintiffs were jointly interested in the crops. The court below rendered
judgment for damages on the theory that one plaintiff had a fourth
interest and the other plaintiff three-fourths interest in the crops and
the judgment entered was in proportion thereto, after overruling a
demurrer for misjoinder.
1. Landlord and his tenant cannot join in an action at law for
damages for tort in injury to the crops unless they are jointly interested in the crops.
2. Where the complaint shows on its face that one plaintiff is
the owner of the land and entitled to separate and distinct one-fourth
interest in the crop and that the other plaintiff is a tenant and is entitled
to a separate and three-fourth interest in the crop there was a joinder of
two separate and distinct causes of action. Under the allegations of
the complaint the landlord could recover for injury to the reversion
only and the tenant for injury to the possession only.
3. Under these circumstances there was an improper joinder of
parties plaintiff.
4. The finding of the trial court, upon evidence introduced on
the sole question of damages, that the landlord and tenant are jointly
interested in the crops did not have the effect of converting the complaint into the statement of a joint right of action.--udgment reversed.
EJECTMENT-DISPUTED BOUNDARIES-CHANGING CAUSE OF ACTION BY ANSWER-Brown, et al. vs. Fenton, et al.-No. 13945

-Decided June 8, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Fenton brought suit in ejectment in county court to recover possession of a quarter section of land and damages for wrongful detention.
The answer admitted Fenton's ownership and right of possession;
denied ouster and damages, and the answer further alleged that the
boundaries of the tracts of land between plaintiff and defendant were
in dispute and that numerous landowners would be affected by the
establishment of the boundaries and demanded that they be made parties and the disputed boundaries established by a surveyor appointed by
the court. Thereupon the cause was transferred to the district court
and various demurrers and motions were sustained or overruled which
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resulted in eliminating all of the parties save the original parties, and
the district court thereupon declined to go into the question of disputed
boundaries and the trial proceeded as a simple action for possession and
damages and judgment was for the plaintiff.
1. In an action in ejectment for possession of real estate where
ownership and right of possession are admitted, it is not permissible to
defend on the sole ground of disputed boundaries and convert the cause
into one for a survey of the lands of all persons presumably concerned,
involving a survey of approximately half a township and the conflicting
interests of countless parties.
2. While an equitable defense is permissible in a law action, it
was not permissible here. As soon as defendants answered it clearly
appeared that there was no matter in dispute. Fenton merely claimed
that he was the owner and entitled to possession and his ownership and
right of possession were admitted. Here there was an attempt to make
a complete conversion of an action in ejectment into an equitable procedure for the determination of disputed boundaries. The complaint
presented no action which could be so converted. Fenton gets nothing
save what he already had and the defendants lose nothing they claimed.
-- Judgment affirmed.
FRAUD-SUIT ON CONTRACT-CAUSE OF ACTION-SOUNDING IN
TORT-BODY JUDGMENT--SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-AL-

vs. WitinNo. 13634-Decided June 8, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
Florence G. Wheeler sued Frank J. Wilkin on contract. At the
close of plaintiff's case defendant moved for a nonsuit. The court
granted the motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff seeks a reversal
of the judgment of dismissal.
1. Where plaintiff alleged that the defendant, by false representations, induced the plaintiff to purchase 30 shares of corporate stock
and pay $3,000 therefor and that upon discovering the fraud, plaintiff
tendered back the stock and demanded the return of the purchase price
and that the defendant admitted his liability and agreed to pay interest
on the amount until the repayment of the principal and that if the
officers of the company failed to repurchase the stock within one year,
that the defendant would repurchase it at par; and that in inducing the
purchase of stock, defendant was guilty of malice, fraud and wilful
deceit and body judgment was prayed for, such complaint does not
state a cause of action in tort, but is a cause of action for money had
and received and is an action upon contract.
2. Where one has received money which in equity and good conscience he ought to pay over to another, the law creates a promise to pay,
and if he refuses to pay, an action in assumpsit for money had and
received will lie.
LEGATIONS OF FRAUD--AMENDMENTS-Wheeler
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3. The allegation that defendant was guilty of malice, fraud and
wilful deceit and the prayer for a body execution did not convert that
action into a tort action.
4. A body execution may issue in actions founded upon tort.
That does not mean in tort actions only. If an action grows out of a
tort it is founded upon tort within the meaning of the statute.
5. The first suit that was dismissed without prejudice is not a
bar to the present action on the theory that the first action was in tort
and the second action in contract.
6. The present complaint states a cause of action.
7. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege that she accepted
defendant's offer and agreed to forbear suit. It was not necessary for
plaintiff to agree to forbear; it was sufficient that, in reliance upon
defendant's request and promise, she did forbear to sue.
8. Another objection urged is complaint does not state positively
that plaintiff relied upon the representations, but merely alleges "that
relying upon such false and fraudulent representations," she bought the
stock. When the participial form of verbs is used in stating such facts,
instead of tenses conveying the sense of more positive statement, while
such form of statement is not to be commended, still, if it is plain that
the facts are intended to be positively stated and alleged, such mode of
allegation will not render the pleading bad on demurrer.
9. Forbearance or a promise to forbear suit even upon a doubtful claim is sufficient consideration.
10. Amendments to pleadings are largely within the discretion
of the court and no abuse of discretion is shown in the court's refusal
for leave to amend.--Judgment reversed.
The former opinion is withdrawn. Mr. Justice Holland dissents.
Mr. Justice Hilliard did not participate.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY

FOR DEATH FROM BURNS

CAUSED BY DESTRUCTION OF BUNKHOUSE--State Compensation

InsuranceFund, et al. vs. The IndustrialCommission of Colorado,

et al.-No. 13947-Decided June 8, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
The company, which carried its industrial insurance with the

fund, operated a mine near Alma, Colorado. Deceased was there employed and he and some of his companions were sleeping in its bunkhouse. During the night this building caught fire and Nerim incurred
the burns which caused his death. Claim was made for compensation

under the act and allowed by the referee and the commission and this
award was affirmed by the district court.
1. Where the employee is required by the employer to sleep in
its bunkhouse during his period of rest from his actual work in the mine
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and his death is caused from burns incurred in a fire which destroyed
the bunkhouse while he was so occupying it, such death was caused by
an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
2. The fact that the room and board for the employee was not
furnished by the company but he was -charged $1.25 per day therefor,
does not change the rule where it appears that the deceased was obliged
to room and board at the bunkhouse as a condition of his employment
and that this was not only a company regulation but a matter of stern
necessity enforced by the location of the company's mine and the total
absence of other available accommodations. The test is whether or not
the workman is given a choice in the matter. Here the employee had no
choice.--Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--PUBLIC UTILITIES-METHOD OF DETERMINING WHETHER A CORPORATION IS A PUBLIC UTILITY-

Colorado Utilities Corporation vs. The Public Utilities Commission-No. 13481-Decided June 22, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
Moffat Coal Company is a Colorado corporation organized as a
coal mining company but with power under its charter to generate and
furnish electrical energy. It had a surplus of electrical energy which it
sold to the town of Oak Creek under a written contract which specifically provided that the coal company was not a public utility or service
company and that it did not undertake to furnish electrical power or
energy to the public nor to the inhabitants of the town but merely delivered electrical energy to the town and the town attended to the distribution thereof to its citizens. Application was made to the Public Utili.
ties Commission to have Moffat Coal Company declared to be a public
utility and to be required to take out a certificate of authority as such.
The commission found that it was not a public utility within the meaning of the public utilities act and upon proceedings for review in the
district court the district court affirmed this finding.
1. The mere fact that a corporation primarily engaged in the
coal mining business has the power under its charter to construct a plant
for the production of electricity and to furnish, sell and supply the same,
does not in itself make it a public utility.
2. In addition to the power so conferred by its charter it must
be actually engaged as such to be declared a public utility.
3. The fact that it generated more electrical energy than was
required for its own business as a coal -mining company and sold and
delivered the surplus to a municipality, but had nothing to do with the
distribution thereof, does not make it a public utility.
4. The contract between the Moffat Coal Company and the
town of Oak Creek specifically excluded it as a public utilty.
5. Whether or not it is a public utility depends upon what it
does and not upon the powers conferred upon it by its charter.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
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WATERS-ADJUDICATION OF WATER RIGHTS--NOTICE OF HEARING
-RIGHT TO REARGUMENT-REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND DECREE

-Martinez, et al. vs. The San Luis Power and Water Company,
et al.-No. 13934-Decided June 15, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
This writ is directed to a judgment refusing a reargument and
review of findings and decree in a water adjudication and was before
the Supreme Court on an application to make the writ a supersedeas.
Defendants in error failed to appear and the record is short and insufficient to determine the amount of a bond should the supersedeas be
allowed.
1. Where no notice of hearing on the report of the referee in a
water adjudication was served upon the plaintiffs in error and they had
no knowledge of the hearing and were not present and had no opportunity to object to the entry of decree, the court below should have
granted a review or reargument.
2. Section 1789, Compiled Laws of 1921, provides in this class
of cases that the trial court for good cause shown is permitted to grant
a reargument or review of such decree provided a petition therefor is
filed within two years. Much discretion with relation thereto is vested
in the trial court, but the difficulty here is that no such discretion was
exercised for the reason that the judge concluded he had none. In this
he was in error.--Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to hear and consider the petition for review.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-LOAN--STOCKHOLDER--SUF-

FICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT VERDICT-ULTRA VIRES

-The Silver State Building and Loan Association vs. CrumpNo. 13956-Decided June 15, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice

Burke.
Crump brought this action to recover on an alleged loan. The
association contended he was a mere stockholder. The jury returned the
verdict for Crump and to review the judgment entered thereon the association prosecutes this writ of error and asks that it be made a supersedeas.
1. Crump bought stock in the association on monthly payments. Before completing these he became dissatisfied and he sought to
withdraw, which under his contract he was entitled to do. An author.
ized agent settled with him for what he termed "a time certificate paying off in a period of one year." Later the agent attempted to substitute
other stock by delivering the same to Crump's wife. This was returned
when Crump demanded payment as per his receipt. The association
thus claims an acceptance. The question was properly submitted to the
jury, which resolved it against plaintiff in error.
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2. In order for the defense of ultra vires to be available it must
be pleaded.
3.
Where a corporation has profited by a transaction and a party
has dealt with the corporation relying on its power to do a certain act
and by reason thereof has changed his position, the defense of ultra vires
on behalf of the corporation is not available.
4. This was a case of conflicting evidence and the verdict of the
jury is amply supported.--Judgment affirmed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LOCAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT BONDS
OBLIGATIONS-NONLIABILITY OF CITY ON GUAR-GENERAL
ANTY OF, LOCAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT BONDS-The City of

Aurora v's. Krauss-No. 13647-Decided June 15, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Krauss sued the city of Aurora to recover judgment on thirteen
$1,000 bonds owned by him, payment of which was in default. For
a first cause of action he alleged the bonds to be general obligations of
the city. In a second cause of action he sought to hold the city by
reason of its guaranty of the bonds. The plaintiff recovered judgment
for the face of the bonds and interest.
1. Where it appears that the city adopted an ordinance creating
an improvement district, known as water district No. 3, which embraced about one-fourth of the city and provided for the issuance of
district bonds, and further provided that the city guaranteed the payment of the payment bonds, bonds issued in pursuance thereof were not
general obligations of the city, but were the obligations of the particular
water district.
2. The municipality was without power to guarantee the payment of the local improvement district bonds.
3. The bonds in this case having a maturity in six years after
their issuance are void upon their face as a general obligation, because
such bonds must mature in not less than ten years.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Bouck concur in part and dissent in part.
CARRIERS-LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER FREIGHT-AGREE-

MENT OF CARRIERS TO DEFER DELIVERY-No DEFENSE-

Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Spano-No. 13905-Decided June 22, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This was an action in damages for refusal of a common carrier to
deliver a carlot shipment of grapefruit to the consignee. Delivery of
the shipment, which arrived in Denver about 10:40 a. m., could have
been made within from fifteen minutes to two hours, as the consignee
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demanded, but was refused by the carrier during business hours of that
day. In consequence, the market declining, the consignee suffered damage. The defense below was on the theory that an agreement previously entered into by all Denver delivering railroads to the effect that
freight of the character involved arriving after 7:00 a. m. shall not be
delivered before 5:30 p. m. of the same day, was such an agreement as
absolved the railroad company from making delivery to the consignee.
The plaintiff had judgment below.
1. The carrier was bound to convey the shipment to its destination and make delivery to the consignee on reasonable demand during
business hours.
2. A failure to so deliver constitutes negligence with consequent
liability for loss due to decline on the market during retention of the
shipment.
3. An agreement between the carrier and all other railroads serving Denver not to make delivery between 7:00 a. m. and 5:30 p. m. is
unreasonable and is not binding upon the consignee and constitutes no
defense.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
TAXATION-MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION-EFFECT

OF CERTIFICATE

OF COUNTY TREASURER THAT ALL TAXES ARE PAID ON REAL
ESTATE-LIABILITY

OF MUNICIPALITY AND COUNTY

TREAS-

URER THEREFOR-Burton us. City and County of Denver, et al.

-No.
13808-Decided June 22, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
Burton brought this action to have tax sales held void, certificates
of purchase cancelled and claims based thereon adjudged invalid. He
based his right to the relief prayed for on a certificate of taxes paid,
issued by the county treasurer. He bought the property relying upon
this certificate of the county treasurer that all taxes were paid. The
taxes had not been paid and there was an outstanding tax sale. Judgment went against Burton below.
1. The suit was properly brought against the City and County
of Denver. It was not necessary to bring it against the board of county
commissioners and the treasurer.
2. The purpose of the statute requiring the treasurer to give a
certificate of all taxes due cannot be construed as only requiring a certificate of taxes due and not to cover no taxes due. The statute covers
both the affirmative and negative. This was the purpose of the act.
They require the treasurer not only to certify as to taxes due, but also
to cover a certificate that all taxes were paid or that no taxes were due;
3. The statute requiring the county treasurer to give such certificate is a valid statute and is not in conflict with Section 7179, C. L.
1921, which provides that taxes on real estate shall be a perpetual lien
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upon such real estate until paid. While the two statutes seem to be in
conflict, yet they must be read together and reconciled if possible. They
can be and are reconciled and these statutes together mean simply that
the taxes should be a perpetual lien upon the real estate until paid or
until the treasurer certifies payment.
4. The two statutes can be further reconciled on the ground that
the word "paid" is often very loosely used and is always liberally construed. Hence, the requirement of Section 7179 that the tax remained
a lien until paid may well have been considered by the Legislature as
met by the further provision that the loser, under a false certificate, was
given, as payment, a claim for the amount against the treasurer's bond.
5. The statute under this construction does not conflict with
Sections 3, 8, 9 and 10 of Article X and Sections 25 and 38 of Article
V of the state constitution.--4udgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Campbell not participating.

OSTEOPATHS-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-NECESSITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY-NEGLIGENT TREATMENT-MOTION FOR NON-

SUIT-Farrah vs. Patton-No. 13693-Decided June 22, 1936
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Farrah sued Patton, an osteopath, for damages for alleged negligence. The evidence showed that the plaintiff consulted the osteopath
for a stiff neck and that the defendant gave the plaintiff's neck a terrific
jerk which paralyzed one side of his body, besides other injuries as a
direct and immediate result therefrom, and that this condition had continued for over three years. A motion for nonsuit was sustained by the
court below.
1. In ordinary malpractice cases the question of whether or not
a physician was negligent must be tested by the recognized standards of
his own school, and such standards must be established by the testimony
of experts.
In certain types of malpractice cases, negligence can be
proved by nonexpert witnesses.
2.
This is true where the recovery is sought, not for negligence
in making an incorrect diagnosis or in adopting the wrong standard of
treatment, but for theo performance of an operation in a negligent manner, in which case any pertinent evidence having a fair tendency to sustain the charge of negligence is sufficient to take the case to the jury.
3.
Here the plaintiff admits that the diagnosis was correct and
that the proper standard of treatment was adopted, but contends that
defendant applied that standard in a negligent manner and there was
sufficient evidence to the jury as the plaintiff made a prima facie
showing of negligence on the part of the defendant, and of a causal
connection between that negligence and the plaintiff's injuries.-Judgment reversed.
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INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-NOTICE

OF

DEATH-WAIVER-Federal

Life Insurance Company vs. Wells-No. 1361 O-Decided March
30, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Katherine Wells, the plaintiff, recovered judgment against the
insurance company on an accident insurance policy. The company seeks
a reversal of the judgment. The insured was killed instantly by lightning on June 10, 1931, while the policy was in force. The policy provided for immediate notice. Written notice was given on May 25, 1933.
1. The question was properly submitted to the jury as whether
or not the insurance company waived the requirements of the policy
respecting the time of giving notice and also whether or not notice of
death was given within a reasonable time and on these issues the jury
found in favor of the plaintiff. The undisputed evidence shows that the
plaintiff waived compliance with the provisions in question.
2. Where the insurance company, prior to filing its answer,
assigned for its only reason for denying liability that the claim did not
come within the coverage of the policy, it waived its right to insist upon
all other grounds of objection, including failure to comply with the provisions concerning the time to give notice.
3. The word "coverage" means the sum of risks which the insurance policy covers. The word cannot be stretched to cover a failure to
give notice within a specified time.
4. An attempted reservation in a letter that the letter was written
without prejudice to or waiver of any of the defendant's rights or
defenses is not available where the defendant definitely stated the specific ground upon which it based its denial of liability.
5. A denial of liability or a refusal to pay not predicated on the
failure to furnish proofs is a waiver of any objection on that ground,
irrespective of whether the denial precedes or follows the time within
which proofs should have been furnished. The same rule applies to
cases involving failure to give notice within the prescribed time. It is
the general rule that before one can be charged with waiver there must be
some change of position to the detriment of the other person and the
present case meets the requirements for relying upon the fact that the
sole reason assigned for denial of liability was that the claim did not
come within the coverage of the policy. The claimant might have believed that the only defense would be that the policy does not cover death
by lightning.-Judgmentaffirmed.
American Accident Insurance Company vs. Cavaleri-No. 13862-Decided
March 30, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The insurance company issued to Cavaleri a policy of insurance
whereby it agreed to pay to the plaintiff Nettie Cavaleri a sum of money
in case Cavaleri should die through external, violent and accidental
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-SUICIDE--SANE-North
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means causing his death within ninety days from the occurrence of the
accident. While the policy was in force Cavaleri committed suicide by
shooting himself in the head with a gun. There was no evidence of
insanity. Plaintiff recovered below.
1. In order to recover on a policy insuring against accidental
death, a plaintiff must prove that the insured died as the result of an
accident.
2. Where a person commits suicide while insane, the death is
accidental; where he commits suicide while sane, the death is not accidental.
3. Every person is presumed to be sane until the contrary
appears.
4. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by the fact of
suicide.
5. There being no evidence having the slightest tendency to show
that Cavaleri was insane when he committed suicide and as plaintiff
failed to prove accidental death, she failed to show a right of recovery
on the accident policy.--Judgment reversed.

COMPLAINT-DEPARTUREPLEADING-DEMURRER-AMENDED
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-INSTALLMENTS---Schildt vs. ToplissNo. 13921 -Decided March 30, 1936-O-0-pinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
Topliss sued Schildt to recover an unpaid balance of $1000 on the
purchase price of real estate, and to establish the same as a lien against
the property. The plaintiff prevailed below.
1. To the original complaint, alleging a promise to pay on demand, a demurrer was filed on the grounds of want of facts and the
bar of the statute. An amended complaint was filed alleging a promise
to pay within three years. Motion was filed to strike on the grounds
of departure. The motion was overruled and Schildt answered. By
answering the defendant waived the departure, if any.
2. The date of the transaction alleged was August 30, 1926. The
answer pleads and the evidence shows that the unpaid balance was to
be met by annual installments, the last of which would fall due August
30, 1929. The complaint being filed March 20, 1935, and the amended
complaint June 13 following, both the pleading and proof bring the
cause within the six year statute.
3. The statute of frauds not being pleaded was waived. However, half of the purchase price was paid and the defendant had both the
deed and possession of the property.
4. The allegation that the balance was to be paid in three years
is not inconsistent with pleadings and proof that it was to be so paid
in installments.--Judgmentaffirmed.
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